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Abstract
We propose a simple theory of predatory pricing, based on scale economies and sequential
buyers (or markets). The entrant (or prey) needs to reach a critical scale to be successful. The
incumbent (or predator) is ready to make losses on earlier buyers so as to deprive the prey
of the scale it needs, thus making monopoly profits on later buyers. Several extensions are
considered, including markets where scale economies exist because of demand externalities or
two-sided market eﬀects, and where markets are characterised by common costs. Conditions
under which predation may take place in actual cases are also discussed.
JEL Code: K21, L12, L40.
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Introduction

Existing models of predatory pricing rely on information asymmetries to explain why an incumbent
firm may have an incentive to prey upon rivals. In reputation, signalling, and financial market
predation models,1 information asymmetries are required for predation to take place (for instance,
the entrant does not know the cost of the incumbent; or external financiers do not observe the
behaviour of the entrant once it has obtained outside funds). In turn, this makes predation models
(relatively) sophisticated.2
In this paper, we present a simple theory of predation which does not depend on information
asymmetries, and which is based instead on the co-existence of scale economies and sequential
buyers (or markets). Intuitively, our mechanism works as follows. In an industry where there
exist scale economies (which can be either on the supply side or the demand side), the incumbent
engages in below-cost pricing to some early buyers (or markets) to deprive the entrant of key
profits it would need to operate successfully, thereby deterring its entry into the industry. Once
secured those early buyers and pre-empted entry, the incumbent will be able to raise prices on the
remaining buyers (or markets), thereby recouping losses. The two usual ingredients of predation,
∗ We are very grateful to Claudio Calcagno for excellent research assistance and for comments. We also thank
Patrick Rey and seminar participants at Università di Bologna, Univ. di Padova, European University Institute
(Florence), and Univ. Pompeu Fabra (Barcelona) for valuable suggestions.
† Università Bocconi, CSEF and CEPR
‡ Università di Bologna and CEPR
1 Kreps and Wilson (1982) are the main reference for reputation-based predation models. Milgrom and Roberts
(1982) explain predation through a signalling model, which has later been applied by Saloner (1987) to model
predation for takeovers, by Scharfstein to model test-market predation, and Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) to show
how predation might limit the ability of a new entrant to infer about its profitability. See Bolton and Scharfstein
(1990) for a theory which models predation in (imperfect) financial markets, by putting on firmer grounds the
so-called ’long purse’ theory of predation.
2 For a discussion on whether there are real-world cases which fit the ’story’ described by such models, see Bolton,
Brodley and Riordan (2000, 2001) and Elzinga and Mills (2001).
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early sacrifice of profits followed by later recoupment once the prey has exited, are therefore present
in our theory as well.
In our model, the incumbent may exclude an entrant even if the latter is more eﬃcient and if it
has the possibility to match the former’s oﬀers. When the incumbent and the entrant ’fight’ to win
the early buyers, the entrant will benefit of higher cost eﬃciency, but it will at most get duopoly
profits on the later buyers, since the incumbent has already sunk its entry costs (or it has already
the minimum customer base needed to operate profitably) and will therefore not exit the market.
Instead, the incumbent knows that by deterring early entry it will enjoy monopoly profits in the
future, and this - other things being equal - prompts it to cut prices more on the earlier buyers
(or markets). As long as its eﬃciency disadvantage is not very large, the incumbent will be able
to successfully prey upon the rival. Otherwise, the early buyers will buy (at prices lower than the
incumbent’s marginal costs) from the entrant and predation will not succeed.
We intentionally keep our model as simple and parsimonious as possible, to highlight our
predation mechanism, discuss conditions under which it holds, and show that it can be applied to
several contexts. After presenting the basic model (Section 2), where scale economies take the form
of fixed entry cost that the entrant needs to pay, we show in Section 3 that our predation results
are robust to a number of changes: predation may take the form of limiting the prey’s expansion,
rather than deterring its entry; it may deter entry in adjacent markets related by common costs;
it may occur in markets characterised by demand-side scale economies (consumers have network
externalities) or even in two-sided markets (one consumer group’s utility increases with the number
of consumers of the other side).
The predation mechanism we highlight seems to be present in a number of recent predation cases
that took place in Europe (in the US, after the 1993 Supreme Court judgment in Brooke Group and
the requirement that plaintiﬀs prove recoupment, there have been no successful predatory cases).
Let us briefly review some of these cases.
In 2004 the Italian Antitrust Authority found that Telecom Italia, the public monopolist before
the liberalisation process, had abused a dominant position.3 Telecom Italia was found to set prices
in a selective and aggressive way and to engage into cross-subsidisation, with the aim of taking away
key customers from its rivals (internal documents showed Telecom Italia’s management was willing
to incur losses in order to win - or win back - important business customers), thereby hindering
their expansion.4 Among other episodes, it was found guilty of price abuses in the 2002 CONSIP
auction for supplying fixed and mobile telephony services to the Italian Public Administrations.
The fact that firms competed in the pricing conditions to business customers and that formal
tender auctions existed, makes this market very similar to the one described in our base model,
which can be seen as a sequence of auctions.
In 2003 the European Commission adopted a decision against Wanadoo Interactive, a subsidiary
of France Télécom, for abuse of a dominant position in the form of predatory pricing in ADSLbased Internet access services for the general public.5 The Commission found that Wanadoo’s retail
3 Comportamenti

abusivi di Telecom Italia. Decision No. 13752, 16 November 2004.
instance, at Para. 275, a cable rival, Fastweb, argues that Telecom Italia’s strategy aimed at eliminating
competitors’ incentives to invest in new and non-recoverable alternative telecom infrastructure, with the ultimate
eﬀect of inhibiting the development of competitors in the long-run.
5 European Commission Decision COMP/38.233 of 16 July 2003. Upheld by the Court of First Instance in Case
4 For
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prices were well below average variable costs between March 2001 and August 2001 and that in
the subsequent period up to October 2002 they were approximately equivalent to average variable
costs, but significantly below average total costs. As a result, Wanadoo’s market share grew from
46% to 72%, while its main competitor’s market share fell considerably, one ADSL service provider
(Mangoosta) went out of business, and no competitor had more than 10% of the market.
Paras. 351-352 of the Wanadoo Decision describe a setting which emphasises the importance
of incumbency advantages and scale economies, making it close to the mechanism pinned down in
our paper, and perhaps especially so to the network externality version of the model (see Section
3.3):
"[. . . ] Service providers must, during this high-speed market development phase,
build an image as the default supplier of a product viewed by the consumer as technically sophisticated and become large enough to benefit from economies of scale.
In this process, the chronological sequence of entry into the market is far from neutral. Clearly, a service provider that has a considerable head start over its competitors
during the initial phase of market growth is able to capitalise on the momentum thus
gained. By contrast, laggards must make a much bigger eﬀort to acquire customers
if they wish to make up for lost time and bridge the resulting image gap and confer
on their high-speed service the same notoriety as that of the dominant undertaking’s
flagship oﬀering. In these circumstances, new competitors are confronted with the need
not only to carry out the expenditure technically necessary in order to provide the service but also to undertake substantial advertising and promotional expenditure both
to raise their product’s profile and to undermine loyalty to the dominant undertaking’s
brand."
In November 2008 the UK Oﬃce of Fair Trading (OFT) found that Cardiﬀ Bus had infringed
Chapter II of the UK Competition Act 1998 by engaging in predatory conduct during the period
from 19 April 2004 to 18 February 2005.6 In response to 2 Travel’s entry into the market with a
new no-frills bus service, Cardiﬀ Bus introduced its own no-frills bus service (the ’white service’),
running on the same routes and at similar times of day as 2 Travel’s services. The white services
were run at a loss until shortly after 2 Travel’s exit, when Cardiﬀ Bus discontinued them. In this
case as well, scale economies were important both at the level of single routes and at the level of
developing the bus network. While Cardiﬀ Bus was the (dominant) incumbent and had already
developed a strong network, other bus companies would have had to incur substantial costs to
develop it.
In 2001 the OFT found that Napp, a pharmaceutical company, had contravened Chapter II of
the UK Competition Act 1998 through its behaviour in the market for the supply and distribution
of sustained release morphine in the United Kingdom. This infringement involved both a charge of
predatory pricing in the hospital segment and one of excessive pricing in the community segment
(Napp had a market share well in excess of 90% in both segments). While at first sight it may
appear odd that Napp could engage in too low prices in a market segment and too high prices in
T-340/03 of 30 January 2007.
6 Decision of the Oﬃce of Fair Trading No. CA98/01/2008 of 18 November 2008.
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another market segment, our mechanism fits this case very well. Sustained release morphine was
sold to two completely diﬀerent groups of buyers. One group is represented by hospitals, which
have a high demand elasticity (pharmaceuticals have to be paid out of their budget) and can
count on the advice of specialist doctors for an assessment of the competing products. The other
group is represented by the so-called ’community segment’, where buyers are general practitioners
(GPs) who prescribe products for their patients (with the National Health Service paying the bills),
and who - not being experts - tend to choose those products which have already been chosen by
hospitals. This can be seen as an asymmetric two-sided market, where hospitals mostly care about
the prices (and do not care about choices made by GPs), while the demand of the community
segment strongly depends on the choices made by hospitals. As we shall show in Section 3.4, an
incumbent like Napp may want to sell below costs to the crucial side of the market (the hospital
market in this case) to make sure the rival does not win it, thereby deterring buyers on the other
side of the market (in this case, the community segment) - whose demand is characterised by a
positive externality with that of the former side - from buying from the entrant. As a result, they
will be obliged to buy from the incumbent, which can behave like a monopolist on this (community)
side of the market, recouping any losses made to win the other (hospital) side.
In a 2002 case, the OFT found that Aberdeen Journals adopted predatory behaviour in the
pricing of advertising space in its Aberdeen Herald & Post newspaper.7 This practice was aimed at
driving the Aberdeen & District Independent newspaper (its only competitor) out of the market.
Aberdeen Journals was found dominant in the market for the supply of advertising space in local
newspapers (paid-for and free) within the Aberdeen area. In this case as well limiting the scale
of operations of the prey appears to have a crucial role. The OFT acknowledged that while the
costs of launching a local free newspaper are relatively low, the cost of sustaining and expanding
presence is higher (the costs of establishing a distribution network are also high). Entrants typically
incur losses in the first years until suﬃcient levels of credibility and acceptability by advertisers are
reached. By taking readers away from a rival, an incumbent newspaper reduces the rival’s demand
for advertising space, undermining its operations.
Finally, in 2001, the European Commission found that Deutsche Post (DPAG) had abused a
dominant position in the market of mail order parcel services.8 The Commission argues that by
making use of predatory pricing and fidelity rebates, DPAG tried to prevent competitors in the
mail-order service from developing the infrastructure needed to compete successfully. The idea
that the incumbent’s pricing policy aimed at depriving the rivals of economies of scale and scope
emerges clearly from the following quote (where ’cooperation partners’ are customers with very
large orders):
"Contrary to what DPAG maintains, all of the disputed fidelity rebates are likely to have
an eﬀect on the opportunities that other suppliers of mail-order parcel services have to
compete. Successful entry into the mail-order parcel services market requires a certain
critical mass of activity (some 100 million parcels or catalogues) and hence the parcel
7 Decision of the Director General of Fair Trading No. CA98/14/2002 of 16 September 2002. Upheld by Competition Appeal Tribunal in Case No. 1009/1/1/02 of 23 June 2003.
8 European Commission Decision COMP/35.141 of 20 March 2001 ("Deutsche Post" ). Published in the Oﬃcial
Journal of the European Communities, OJ L 125/27 of 5 May 2001.

4

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper405

4

Fumagalli and Motta: A Simple Theory of Predation

volumes of at least two cooperation partners in this field. By granting fidelity rebates
to its biggest partners, DPAG has deliberately prevented competitors from reaching
the ‘critical mass’ of some 100 million in annual turnover. This fidelity rebating policy
was, in precisely the period in which DPAG failed to cover its service-specific additional
costs (1990 to 1995), a decisive factor in ensuring that the ‘tying eﬀect’ of the fidelity
rebates for mail-order parcel services maintained an ineﬃcient supply structure [...]."
(Deutsche Post, para. 37)
In Section 3.2 we formalise a predation model which fits the facts of the Deutsche Post case.
Let us close the introduction with a note on the related literature. Obviously, our paper
belongs to the literature on predatory pricing we have referred to above. However, the mechanism
we propose is a new one, which may help rationalise predation in particular cases where previous
theories of predation may not apply. In other cases, however, our mechanism might well co-exist
with other rationales for predation. For instance, an incumbent may prey upon a rival in the initial
stages of a market, both as an attempt to deprive it of key profits (and thus to prevent it from
enjoying scale economies), and as a way to signal that it would behave aggressively in the future
- consistent with what suggested by incomplete information models. Further, our mechanism is
consistent with Bolton and Scharfstein (1990)’s financial market predation model: predation, by
denying profits to the rival, also reduces the assets available to it, and therefore limits its possibility
to obtain outside funding.
Our paper is also closely related to the more general literature on exclusion and, in particular, to
the principle established by Bernheim and Whinston (1998) where ineﬃcient exclusion arises due to
the existence of contracting externalities that agents fail to internalise. In our case, the agents who
take their decisions in the early periods (the incumbent, the entrant and the early buyers) do not
internalise the payoﬀ of subsequent buyers, thereby finding it jointly profitable to exclude the more
eﬃcient entrant, even though exclusion reduces total welfare. Contracting externalities are also at
the basis of exclusion in Segal and Whinston (2000) where, under the presence of multiple buyers
and supply-side economies of scale, the incumbent uses exclusive dealing contracts to deter eﬃcient
entry. An important diﬀerence, though, is that - in addition to the incumbency advantage which
exists in our paper as well - in Segal and Whinston (2000) the incumbent also enjoys a first-mover
advantage (i.e., it can make oﬀers to buyers before the entrant could materialize and make counteroﬀers), which facilitates exclusion. Indeed, in the case where buyers are approached sequentially,
where the timing of the game is the closest to our model, entry deterrence does not require any
sacrifice of profits by the incumbent. More generally, our paper is also related to models where
exclusion occurs due to discriminatory oﬀers. In this perspective, the main reference is probably
Innes and Sexton (1994)’s "divide and conquer" strategy, a more recent paper being Karlinger and
Motta (2007). Finally, the fact that exclusion takes place by depriving the entrant, in early periods,
of profits it needs to operate successfully in the long run makes our exclusionary mechanism close
also to Carlton and Waldman (2002)’s paper on exclusionary tying in complementary markets.
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2

A simple model

In this Section, we introduce our basic model with supply-side scale economies, solve it, and briefly
discuss the results, especially underlining the role of some of the assumptions made.
There are 2 buyers, 1 and 2, with unit demand and valuation  = 1 for a homogeneous
product. The extension to  buyers would not create any conceptual diﬃculty and would leave
qualitative results unchanged. While we assume here that both buyers are necessary for entry to
be profitable, in the extension to  buyers we would limit ourselves to assume that one buyer is
not enough to attract entry. The assumption of inelastic demand is also done for simplicity: the
main diﬀerence is that by assuming elastic demands exclusion would entail not only a productive
ineﬃciency but also an allocative ineﬃciency.9
An incumbent firm, , has already sunk its entry costs, and a potential entrant, , is considering
entry.
Firm  is more cost-eﬃcient than firm , as marginal costs are respectively given by  = 0 
  12, but firm  still needs to pay its entry cost, . We assume that:
    2 

(A1 )

which ensures that there are scale economies: by selling at the Bertrand equilibrium price, the
entrant would be able to operate profitably if it sold to both buyers, but not if it sold to only one.
Furthermore,   2 implies that entry would be socially eﬃcient (there are higher costs when
the Incumbent serves the buyers than when the Entrant does).

2.1

The game

1. First period.
(a) Firms   simultaneously set prices 1 and 1 to buyer 1.
(b) Buyer 1 decides from whom to buy and commits to her choice.
(c) Firm  decides whether to enter (and pay  ) or not.
(d) Transactions take place. If  got the order from buyer 1 but did not enter, buyer 1
purchases from  at the oﬀered price 1 10
2. Second period.
(a) Firms simultaneously set prices 2 and 2 to buyer 2.
(b) Buyer 2 decides from whom to buy and commits to her choice.
(c) If it has not entered yet, firm  decides whether to enter (and pay  ) or not.11
9 Fumagalli and Motta (2008) analyse the model under  buyers and elastic demands, but considers a simultaneous
game and uniform pricing, rather than a sequential one (with possible intertemporal price discrimination) as in this
paper.
1 0 The results would not change if we assumed that the buyer whose order remains unfulfilled is forced to buy
from the incumbent which would then charge the monopoly price.
1 1 Allowing the entrant to enter also at the end of the second period only aﬀects the ’maximum’ price that firm 
could charge to the second buyer after it has already served the first buyer. Allowing for a second chance of entry
implies that instead of charging price  = 1   , the incumbent will charge the ’limit price’  =  (if the price was
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(d) Transactions take place. If  got the order from buyer 2 but did not entered, buyer 2
purchases from  at the oﬀered price 2 
This game has the following equilibria.
Proposition 1 (Sequential - and discriminatory - oﬀers) Equilibria of this game are as follows:
• (Exclusion) If   3 2 ≡ e then firm  and  set 11 = 1 =  −    , buyer 1 buys

from , entry in the first period does not occur, firm  and  set the price 2 = 2 =  the
second buyer buys from  and entry in the second period does not occur.

• (Entry) If  ≤ e then firm  and  set 1 = 1 = 2 −    , buyer 1 buys from ,
entry occurs, firm  and  set 2 = 2 =  with the second buyer buying from .

Proof. Let us move by backward induction. In the second period, if entry occurred in period
1, then standard Bertrand competition between cost-asymmetric firms takes place and the more
eﬃcient entrant obtains the second buyer at the price 2 =  (now and in the rest of the paper
we disregard equilibria in weakly dominated strategies). If instead entry did not occur in period 1,
then firm  has still to pay the entry cost when it competes for the second buyer. It follows that
the entrant’s unit cost to serve 2 is equal to  while the incumbent’s unit cost amounts to   
by assumption 1 Hence, in this case it is the incumbent the low-cost supplier. In equilibrium
the incumbent serves the second buyer at the price 2 =  = 2 and entry does not occur in the
second period either.
In the first period, given the price oﬀers and the decision of the first buyer, firm  decides
whether to enter the market. If 1 decided to buy from firm  entry is profitable as long as rents
collected in the first period, together with the ones that it anticipates to obtain in the second one
are larger than  , i.e.  (1 ) = 1 +  −  ≥ 0. This inequality identifies the minimum price at

which firm  is willing to supply 1 :

e1 =  −   

(by assumption 1).

If instead 1 decided to buy from the incumbent, entry is not profitable as firm  anticipates that
the second-period rents alone are insuﬃcient to cover the entry cost:    by assumption 1.
Lack of entry implies that the incumbent’s second-period profits amount to  −  , and that the
incumbent’s total profits are equal to  (1 ) = 1 −  +  −   Then, the minimum price at which

the incumbent is willing to supply 1 is:

e1 = 2 −   

(by assumption 1)

The comparison between e1 and e1 reveals that

e1 ≥ e1 if (and only if)  

3
≡ e 
2

higher, the entrant would undercut the incumbent and enter). Note that by assuming that entry is possible also at
the second period we make it more diﬃcult for exclusion to take place, since after having deterred entry in the first
period, the incumbent is not able to make the monopoly price 1 but only the lower price  .
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Diﬀerently stated, competition for the first buyer is like an asymmetric Bertrand case where the
incumbent and the entrant have respectively costs 2 −  and  −   The following situations can
then arise:

(i) (Exclusion) If   e the equilibrium is such that 1 = 1 =  −   1 buys from the

incumbent and entry does not occur. By the definition of e  the entrant has no incentive to
undercut.

(ii) (Entry) If  ≤ e the equilibrium is such that 1 = 1 = 2 −  1 buys from the entrant

and entry occurs in the first period. By the definition of e  the incumbent has no incentive to

undercut.

Proposition 1 shows that - if the incumbent is not too ineﬃcient relative to the entrant, or
equivalently if the entrant has fixed costs which are not too low - the game admits a unique
equilibrium where exclusion of the (eﬃcient) entrant takes place due to a predatory strategy by
the incumbent. Indeed, the incumbent sets a price below its own costs of production in the first
period of the game, therefore making losses, to increase its price in the second period, therefore
recouping its previous losses, when it knows that the prey will not be able to enter. The usual
ingredients for predation, namely early profit sacrifice and subsequent recoupment, are thus present
in this simple model.
Note that the exclusionary equilibrium arises even though the incumbent does not enjoy a
first-mover advantage and the more eﬃcient entrant can submit bids at the same time as the
incumbent. The sources of exclusion are: (i) the incumbency advantage enjoyed by firm  i.e. the
fact that the entrant has still to sink the fixed cost  when oﬀers are made, while the incumbent
has already sunk it; (ii) the fact that the revenues earned in the second period alone are insuﬃcient
to cover such a cost (   by assumption 1). This implies that firm  will not find it profitable
to pay the entry cost unless first-period revenues are large enough, which creates scope for the
incumbent to bid aggressively in the first period and to oﬀer a price which is immune to the
entrant’s undercutting. Why bidding such a low price is instead profitable for the incumbent,
despite its variable cost disadvantage? The reason is that, by bidding aggressively in the first
period, the incumbent removes competition from the entrant in the second period and will be able
to charge a high price to the second buyer. Instead, firm  will always face competition by the
incumbent in the second period, which limits the revenues that it can collect from the second buyer.
If the eﬃciency gap between the incumbent and the entrant is not too large (or if the entry cost 
is not too low), such asymmetry in favour of the incumbent is strong enough to enable recoupment
and to cause exclusion.12
If instead firm  could sink the entry cost before bids to the first buyer are made, then the
incumbency advantage of firm  would be eliminated, and the unique equilibrium would be one
with  serving both buyers.
Which markets fit this model? The base model presented in this Section resembles markets where buyers decide on the basis of tender oﬀers (such as public procurement markets), or
1 2 If the incumbent also enjoys a first-mover advantage exclusion will be easier. This is because the incumbent can
take actions to attract the early buyer before the entrant can react, and can therefore exploit in the most profitable
way the negative externality that the first buyer exerts on the other when it decides to buy from the incumbent.
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where buyers are large business customers which negotiate prices with their suppliers, and where
one or more firms have not had the time (or willingness) to develop their infrastructure or build
the necessary production or sales capacity (examples of sectors which immediately come to mind
are construction, transportation, telecommunications).
In the real world there may be situations where a precommitment to entry and building infrastructure is possible, and others where it would not. Think for instance of a situation where
it would take time to carry out certain investments to enter in a given sector or country (licenses
to be obtained, working permits, a large and complex infrastructure to be built, machines to be
bought, construction work to be carried out, and so on), so that the tender oﬀers have to be made
before (most of the) entry costs are sunk. In that case, the timing would be as in our base model,
and exclusion may take place. In other cases, an entrant may instead be able to sink its entry costs
before competing for buyers: exclusion would then be unlikely in our base model with supply-side
scale economies. Note, further, that a simple announcement is not enough: a credible commitment
to enter, with corresponding sunk costs being paid, is necessary to persuade buyers that entry is
irreversible.
While in our base model a precommitment to enter would rule out predation, we show in
Sections 3.1, 3.3 and 3.4 below that the same mechanism based may lead to predation also in cases
(where the entrant does not have excess capacity, or where scale economies are created by demand
externalities) where the entrant is already in the market.
Note also that strategic behaviour by the buyers would not necessarily prevent predation. For
instance, one might think that the first buyer might delay its purchase decision so as to allow entry.
In fact, there is no incentive for her to do so because buying first guarantees prices strictly below
  while by delaying purchases she would get the price  .

2.2

Comments

In this Section, we discuss which assumptions behind the model and its timing drive the predation
result. We also study welfare eﬀects.
2.2.1

Renegotiation (or breach of orders)

The existence of the predatory equilibrium relies on the assumption that buyers cannot modify
their orders after the entry decision. Suppose instead that buyers could breach their initial decision
and change supplier. Also, imagine that in the first period entry takes place even if the first buyer
chose the incumbent. Then 1 ,  and  would have an incentive to find an agreement that allows
firm  to supply the first buyer: due to the entrant’s higher productive eﬃciency the joint welfare of
the three agents in such a case is larger relative to the case where the incumbent is the supplier, and
they all can (weakly) improve their situation as compared with that case. Anticipating this, firm 
might have an incentive to sink the fixed cost even though the first buyer chose the incumbent (more
precisely, this incentive exists if firm  expects to extract enough surplus from the renegotiation).
In turn, the incumbent loses the incentive to undercut any price equal or below   since subsequent
entry removes the possibility to recoup by charging a high price to the second buyer.
This implies that in contexts where renegotiation of contracts is possible and cheap, exclusion
would be less likely to take place. In other contexts, particularly in industries where buyers are
9
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smaller and less concentrated, there may be important transaction costs involved for breaching
orders, resulting in exclusion to be more likely.
Finally, note that absence of renegotiation is a crucial assumption for exclusion in models where
scale economies are on the supply-side, as in the base model analysed in this Section. However, we
shall see in Section 3.3 below that when scale economies are due to network eﬀects, the possibility
of breaching orders does not eliminate the potential for exclusion.
2.2.2

Intertemporal discriminatory pricing v. uniform pricing

We have assumed that buyers can be charged diﬀerent prices across periods, thus allowing for
intertemporal price discrimination. If firms were instead obliged to charge the same price to each
buyer, then predation will never occur. Intuitively, the incumbent has an incentive to make losses
on earlier buyers only if it can recoup them on later buyers, after it is clear that the prey will not
be able to enter. Under intertemporal uniform pricing, this predatory strategy is not possible: if
the incumbent wanted to cut prices, it would have to do so for all buyers, thus implying that it
would never want to sell below cost. The following Lemma proves this point.
Lemma 1 (Sequential - but uniform - prices). For all parameter values, firm  and  set  =
 =  , both buyers buy from , and entry will occur.
Proof. Let us move by backward induction. At the last stage, the second buyer will face the
same prices  ,  paid by the first buyer. The second buyer will buy from  only if  ≤  or
if    but firm  did not enter in the first period and   . The first buyer will buy from

 only if  ≤  or if    but it anticipates that firm  will not make suﬃcient profits to

cover its costs, that is, if 2   (recall that the price for the second buyer coincides with the

one oﬀered to the first buyer). Note however that, by assumption 1,   2 . Hence equilibria
exhibiting exclusion should be such that the incumbent oﬀers a price  below cost to both buyers,
which is unprofitable. The firms will therefore play the standard Bertrand game and  =  = 
is the equilibrium of the game (we disregard weakly dominated strategies.)
2.2.3

Price Commitment

If the game was modified so that first firms bid simultaneously for both buyers and then buyers
choose the supplier sequentially, exclusion cannot arise.13 Indeed, the fact that prices for both
buyers are set simultaneously expands the scope for profitable deviations as compared with the
case of sequential bids. Then, whenever the incumbent bids a pair of prices such that 1 + 2  
the entrant has an incentive to slightly undercut both prices: this would attract both buyers and
would make entry profitable. In order to block the entrant’s deviations the incumbent should bid
a pair of prices such that 1 + 2 ≤  but such an oﬀer would not be profitable for the incumbent

either. For a similar reason, however, entry equilibria exhibit prices below  for both buyers
(namely, 1 = 2 = 2 −    ), as both prices must be immune to the incumbent’s deviation

of undercutting on one buyer and recouping on the other.

1 3 If buyers’ decisions were also simultaneous, then exclusion might arise because of miscoordination failure. See
for instance Fumagalli and Motta (2008).
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2.2.4

Downstream competition

We have assumed so far that buyers are final consumers. This is not necessarily an innocent
assumption in exclusionary models, as showed by Fumagalli and Motta (2006, 2008). When buyers
are retailers who are competing for consumers, we cannot assume any longer that the number of
units they buy from their chosen supplier is fixed. In particular, if the downstream markets
are integrated and retailers are perceived as homogeneous, the buyer-retailer who pays the lower
wholesale price will be able to win all the market demand. In turn, this means that even if the
first buyer has committed to buy from the incumbent, the entrant may guarantee itself enough
scale if it induces the second buyer to buy from it. For this reason, when there exists suﬃciently
fierce downstream competition predation will not occur. If, instead, buyers-retailers were highly
diﬀerentiated, or operated in diﬀerent markets (i.e., downstream competition would be weak or
absent), then the predation result would continue to hold (as long as  is high enough): each
retailer could bring only a share of the total market to the entrant, and if the incumbent managed
to win the first buyer, the second buyer’s order would not be suﬃcient for the entrant to cover its
entry cost.
To formalise this situation, keep the same assumptions on parameters as in the base model,
but assume that in each market  = 1 2 there is a mass of consumers normalised to 1 and with
unit valuation and demand for the product. Consider the following timing of the game.
1
In the first period, firms   set wholesale prices 1 and 
to retailer 1, who decides from

whom to buy (but does not commit on the size of the order). Firm  decides on entry.
2
In the second period, firms simultaneously set prices 2 and 
to retailer 2, who decides from

whom to buy. If it has not entered yet, firm  decides whether to enter (and pay  ) or not.
In the third period, retailers set prices 1 and 2 . Consumers in each market decide. Transactions take place.
In what follows, we limit ourselves to state the result for two extreme cases: (a) independent
markets: consumers in market  can buy only from retailer ; (b) perfect substitutes with Bertrand
competition: consumers can buy from each retailer.14 For intermediate competition cases, we
would expect that - as in Fumagalli and Motta (2008) - if there is suﬃciently fierce competition
downstream, predation may not take place at equilibrium.
Proposition 2 (Downstream competition) Suppose buyers are retailers who sell to final consumers. Equilibria of this game are as follows:
• (Independent market areas) If each retailer sells in a separate final market of size 1
and with unit valuation, then the equilibria are the same as in the base model (in particular,
predation arises if   3 2 ≡ e ).

• (Fierce competition) If the two markets are integrated and retailers compete in prices

for final customers, only the entry equilibrium exists, with wholesale prices 
=  = 

( = 1 2), each buyer-retailer buying from the entrant, and final consumers paying  .
1 4 One can rationalise the two cases as due to transportation costs. If retailer  is located in market , the
independent markets case corresponds to segmented geographical markets with arbitrarily large transportation
costs, the perfect competition case corresponds to integrated markets with zero transportation costs.

11

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2010

11

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 405 [2010]

Proof. (Independent market areas) If retailers are selling in independent markets, then each
retailer can sell at most one unit of the product. Hence, everything will be as in the base model
where buyers are final consumers who buy at most one unit.
(Fierce competition) First, we show that this is an equilibrium,15 as there is no incentive to
deviate from it. At this equilibrium  would enter as  = 2 −   0. If firm  changed its

price(s) it could only reduce its profits: if the price is increased to one buyer only,  would be at
best unchanged if the other buyer still buys from ; if the price is increased to both, buyers will
buy from  and  = 0. If  reduced its wholesale price to one or both buyers, it would still sell
both units but at lower profits. If firm  undercuts to buyer  only (    − =  ), that
buyer would choose to buy from it and would have the lowest cost. Buyer  would then sell both

units, and  would have negative profits. Note that a deviation with lower wholesale price to 
while increasing price to  would still give negative profits to : all units would be sold by 
who pays    . Similarly, if undercutting took place on both buyers. Finally, buyers have no
incentive to deviate at the candidate equilibrium (which would be the standard Bertrand game
played downstream).
Next, we show that an exclusionary equilibrium does not exist. Suppose there is an equilibrium
where, similarly to the base model, firm  does not enter and    , −   . Given competition
downstream, all units would be sold by buyer-retailer , and  = 2( − )  0. More generally,

there cannot exist any exclusionary equilibrium where firm  charges    to at least one buyer.

Consider next a candidate equilibrium where  ≤  ≤ − . This price pair would not survive

the deviation from firm , who would set 
=  − , making  the lowest cost retailer: 

would buy from  and sell both units on the final market, so that   = 2
−  ≥ 2 −   0.

2.2.5

Consumer surplus and welfare

The case of (intertemporal) uniform pricing (see Section 2.2.2 above) provides us with the natural
benchmark for welfare analysis. Indeed, if the incumbent was not allowed to behave strategically
so as to deter entry, that is, if either (intertemporal) price discrimination was forbidden, or the
incumbent was not allowed to set below-cost pricing, the unique equilibrium would be the one
where entry would occur and both buyers would pay  . Predation would clearly harm consumers,
as total consumer surplus under predation would be given by 2 − (2 −  )  2 − 2 , which holds
for   3 2, the latter being precisely the condition under which predation takes place. The

predatory equilibrium is also welfare-inferior, as it entails a productive ineﬃciency. Due to inelastic
demands, the price level just determines the distribution of surplus between buyers and firms, but
not the overall level of surplus. But at the predatory equilibrium the cost of serving the buyers is
2 , whereas at the entry equilibrium it is   2 . Obviously, with any downward-sloping demand
function in addition to the productive ineﬃciency the exclusionary equilibrium would also entail a
deadweight loss.
Note, however, that welfare implications are more delicate than they may appear at first sight.
Banning (intertemporal) price discrimination, or banning below-cost pricing by the incumbent
does not unambiguously increase welfare. In fact, it would reduce it if  ≤ 3 2 - that is when

entry takes place also when price discrimination is feasible - because it would chill competition
1 5 More

precisely, it is the unique entry equilibrium which survives the elimination of weakly dominated strategies.
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and (weakly) lead to higher price. Indeed, if  ≤ 3 2, the fact that the incumbent can price
aggressively under price discrimination will result in the first buyer buying at prices below  ,

and the second buyer at  , while both would buy at  if the incumbent were prevented from
(intertemporal) price discriminating or from selling below cost. Since entry occurs anyhow, total
welfare would be equal under price discrimination and under uniform pricing, but this is just
because of inelastic demands. If we assumed elastic demands, welfare would also be higher under
price discrimination. The following Proposition summarises these results.
Proposition 3 Banning intertemporal price discrimination (or below-cost pricing) would have
ambiguous eﬀects:
• If  ≤ 3 2, it would decrease consumer surplus (leaving total welfare unchanged).
• If   3 2, it would increase consumer surplus and total welfare.
Proof. Follows from text above.
Measures aimed at discouraging price aggressiveness by dominant firms, for instance forbidding
them from discriminating across customers, or from selling below cost, would therefore result in a
trade-oﬀ. On the one hand, they would reduce the chances that anti-competitive exclusion would
take place; on the other hand, when the entrant is suﬃciently more eﬃcient than the incumbent,
exclusion would not occur and they would chill competition and result in higher prices.16

3

Extensions

In this Section, we propose other settings where the same basic mechanism for predation, hinging
on scale economies and externalities among buyers, also applies. Section 3.1 looks at the case
where the entrant has already paid its set-up costs, but would need to make further investments
to increase its capacity; Section 3.2 analyses the case of products which develop over time, but
are related because of common costs; Section 3.3 deals with scale economies on the demand side,
created by the existence of network externalities; finally, Section 3.4 shows that predation may also
appear in two-sided markets.

3.1

Entry v. expansion (predation without exit of the prey)

So far, we have assumed that the incumbent firm can prey upon a firm which has not started
production yet. In this Section, we show that predation might also occur in a market where the
’prey’ is already established, but needs to sink new costs if it wants to expand its scale of operation
(while the incumbent has already established larger capacity). In other words, predation may be
rational not only to deter entry, but also to relegate a smaller rival to a niche market, preventing
it from expanding its scale.
To formalise this idea, consider the following minor variation of the model analysed in Section
2, where firm  and firm  have  captive buyers each, i.e. buyers who already bought from
them in the past and do not want to change supplier. This might be because they have suﬃciently
1 6 See Karlinger and Motta (2007) for similar conclusions in a model with (simultaneous) price discrimination and
network eﬀects.
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high switching costs or because they are located too far from the alternative supplier. In addition,
there are  buyers, 1 and 2 , who have bought from  in the past but have zero switching
costs, and therefore are ready to buy from the supplier who oﬀers the better price (alternatively,
1 and 2 might be new buyers who materialize for the first time and did not buy in the past).
All buyers have a valuation  = 1 for the (homogeneous) product.
Finally, assume that firm  has already incurred the costs 2 necessary to produce   units
of the product, while firm  has incurred only the fixed cost  necessary to produce  units. As
usual, we assume that firm  is more cost-eﬃcient:  = 0   .17 Also, non-captive buyers are
approached sequentially, with the same timing as in Section 2.18
It is easy to see that except that firms must establish also the price for captive buyers, the
game is the same as the sequential one analysed before. Then, it also admits the same equilibria
(and under the same conditions), with ’predation’ occurring or not depending on how large is the
fixed cost  or the eﬃciency gap between the incumbent and firm .
However, there are two interesting features in this simple extension. First, here predation takes
place without firm  exiting the market: the prey will continue to operate and serve the captive
buyers, but predation relegates it to its niche market, that is, to its captive buyers. Firm 
would have had the opportunity to expand and serve the contestable buyers, but the incumbent’s
predatory strategy prevents it from expanding. This is important for policy implications: it is not
necessary that the prey exits the market for predation to take place.
Second, we observe here that in equilibrium there is more price discrimination than in the
previous model. We observe more extensive selective price cuts, with captive buyers ending up
paying the pure monopoly price  = 1 and being deprived of all their surplus, and buyers who
are contestable benefiting (relative to the captive buyers) in a diﬀerent measure: the first free
buyer is always buying below  , whereas the second buyer pays at or above  , but never a higher
price than   1.

3.2

Predation in markets with common costs

The same logic described in the previous Sections applies when there are diﬀerent relevant (either
product or geographic) markets which are related by the existence of common costs. Suppose that
an incumbent firm is already active in all of them, but that the entrant needs time to enter some
of them. This may have been the case in some recently liberalised markets, such as postal services,
where new entry is allowed in some segments of the market (mail-order parcel services, businessto-business mail), while the former public monopolist keeps a "reserved area" for some period after
liberalisation (exclusive rights to carry letters and items weighing less than 200 g);19 or it may be
the case where tariﬀs or other barriers to trade are being phased out, or where it would take a long
time to get all permits needed to operate locally, so that a new firm might be able to enter some
markets immediately, but will be able to enter a particular foreign market only in the future. The
novel insight is that - present economies of scope (in the postal service, common infrastructure, in
1 7 Note that the larger capacity does not result in lower marginal costs, to maintain the usual assumption that
exclusion is ineﬃcient.
1 8 Since there is no competition for captive buyers, it is irrelevant whether they are approached and decide before
or at the same time as free buyers.
1 9 See Deutsche Post AG, Commission Decision of 20 March 2001.
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the international markets example a common R&D or technology) - the incumbent may predate
in the markets which open first, to preserve its monopoly position in all the markets.20
To formalize this situation let us assume that there are two markets denoted as  and  , with
market  being the market which opens first (in the postal service, market  is the market for
letters, market  that for mail-orders). There is independence on the demand side. There is one
consumer on market  and one in market , and each of them attaches a unit valuation to the
product. (Population size is normalised to 1 in each market.) Firm  is already established in
the industry and produces both products. Firm  can enter market  in both the first and the
second period, but can enter market  only in the second period. There is a common fixed cost of
entry,  : once paid  for entering market  , a firm does not need any other set-up costs. Firm 
is more eﬃcient than : in both markets, marginal costs are given by  = 0    12. Finally,
we assume that
2    3

(2)

The game is as follows:
1. First period.
1
and 1
to the buyers, who decide if
(a) Firms   simultaneously set prices 1
 , 


and from whom to buy.
(b) Firm  decides whether to enter market  (and pay  ) or not.
(c) Transactions take place. If  got the order in market  but did not enter, the buyer

purchases from  at the oﬀered price 1

2. Second period.
2
2
(a) Firms   simultaneously set prices 2
and 2
to the buyers, who decide
 , 
 , 

if and from whom to buy.
(b) Firm  decides whether to enter in either market  or market  or both. If it has
not entered market  yet, by paying the cost  firm  can enter both markets. If it
has already entered market  it does not need to pay any additional set-up cost to
operate in market 
(c) Transactions take place. If  got orders in some market but did not enter that market,
the buyer purchases from  at the oﬀered price 2
 with  =  
In what follows, we show that if the fixed cost  is large enough there will be a predatory
equilibrium with deterred entry; otherwise, firm  will enter market  in the first period, and
market  in the second. As in the model of Section 2, there is scope for predation because the
incumbent - but not firm  - has already sunk the common fixed cost when oﬀers are made, and
because the second-period profits alone are insuﬃcient for firm  to cover such cost.
2 0 Also Carlton and Waldman (2002) shows that, in markets related by complementarity in consumption rather
than by the existence of common costs, the incumbent can deter entry in the market that open first in order to
protect its monopoly position in all the markets where it operates. Note, however, that in the supply-side scale
economies version of their model, successful exclusion requires the incumbent to enjoy also a first-mover advantage
and to adopt irreversible tying.
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Proposition 4 (Predation in sequential markets with common costs.) Equilibria of this game are
as follows:
• (Entry) If   5 2 then: in the first period, firm  and  set 1
= 1
=  , 



sets 1
= 1,  supplies market  ,  market . In the second period, firm  and  set

2
2
= 2
= 2
=  , and  supplies both markets.
 = 



• (Predation) If  ≥ 5 2 then: in the first period, firm  and  sets 1
= 1
=  − 2 


 , 1
= 1, firm  supplies both markets and  does not enter  . In the second period,


2
firm  and  set 2
= , 2
= 2
=  −  (with  ∈ [0  ]), and  supplies both
 = 



markets. Firm  does not enter any market.

Proof. By backward induction. Consider the second period first. If  already entered market
 in period 1, then it does not have to incur any cost to enter market  Standard Bertrand
competition with cost-asymmetric firms takes place, and the more eﬃcient firm  supplies both
2
markets fixing the price 2
=  . If  did not enter  in period 1, then it has still to pay
 = 

the common entry cost when it competes with the incumbent in the second period. Since   2
2
(by assumption 2), in equilibrium firm  sets any pair of prices that satisfies 2
=  and
 + 

entry will not occur
Consider now the first period. Since second-period rents alone are insuﬃcient to cover the
entry cost, in the first period firm  finds it profitable to pay  if the rents collected in market
 are large enough: 1
+ 2 −  ≥ 0 The minimum price that firm  is willing to oﬀer to


supply market  in the first period is then: e1
=  − 2   (by assumption 2) In turn, the

incumbent’s minimum price is e1
= 3 −    because if it captures market  in the first


period, it will dominate both markets in the second period (at a total price ), thereby making

profits 1
−  +  − 2 . It is easy to check that when  ≥ 5 2 it is the incumbent who is

willing to bid more aggressively for market  in the first period. (Since there is no threat of entry

in market  in the first period, the price established by the incumbent is 1
= 1 irrespective of

the outcome in market  ).
The model presented here is consistent with the facts of an important EU predatory case,
Deutsche Post. Deutsche Post - which had exclusive rights on the market for letters and small
parcels, was found to have abused a dominant position by the use of predatory pricing and fidelity rebates in the mail-order market. Although the European Commission does not spell any
theory of harm, one rationale for predation may have been that, given the existence of important
common costs with other postal services, mail-order operators could later start to compete with
other services of Deutsche Post. For instance, Hermes Versand Service, the parcel delivery service
subsidiary of a mail-order firm, was initially created for the mail-order trade’s own use, but its
infrastructure was later used to convey parcels for third parties and in 2000 became one of the
largest courier, express mail and parcels operator in Germany.21
2 1 See

Deutsche Post, at paragraph 38 and footnote 64.
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3.3

Network eﬀects

One of the limitations of the exclusionary model analysed so far is that for predation to take place,
it is required that the entrant is not able to pre-commit to production (or additional capacity), or
does not have the time to sink its entry (or expansion) costs. In this Section, we show that under
demand-side scale economies, the entrant may have already sunk its cost (equivalently, one could
assume that there is no entry cost), but this is not suﬃcient to avoid exclusion. Indeed, as in the
previous Sections, it turns out that exclusion will be the only equilibrium if the incumbent does
not have a very strong marginal cost disadvantage vis-à-vis the entrant.
Consider the following model, which is a simplified (sequential) version of Karlinger and Motta
(2008). There are 2 new buyers, 1 and 2 , who are considering to buy a product, and are
characterised by a utility  = ( ) −  if they buy one unit of good  =  , where  ∈  +

indicates the total number of buyers who buy the product in the present period, or have bought in
the past and still use it.22 There are direct network externalities in that (1) = 0 and ( )  0 for
  1. We assume that ( ) = ( +1) =  for any   1. In other words, there are demand-side
scale economies because a firm needs to have at least two consumers for them to reach a positive
utility from the network good, but as soon as there are two buyers, all economies are attained.
This is to keep the analysis as simple as possible, and to make exclusion more diﬃcult.23 The
incumbent firm  has already a customer base  ≥ 2 - the old buyers are not buying any longer,

but continue to use the network product - while the new firm  has no customer yet when the
game starts. Apart from possible diﬀerences in their sizes, the two networks are homogeneous but
incompatible.
Firm  is more cost-eﬃcient than firm : marginal costs are respectively given by 0 =  
  . Note that to focus on the role of network eﬀects, we assume away entry cost. Finally, we
do not impose restrictions on prices which can be also negative. The game is as follows.
1. First period.
(a) Firms   simultaneously set prices 1 and 1 to buyer 1.
(b) Buyer 1 decides from whom to buy.
2. Second period.
(a) Firms   simultaneously set prices 2 and 2 to buyer 2.
(b) Buyer 2 decides from whom to buy.
3. Third period
Consumption takes place and utilities are realized.
The following Proposition illustrates the results of the analysis.
2 2 Here again, the extension to  buyers and the consideration of elastic demands would leave qualitative results
unchanged.
2 3 By making the more general assumption that ( ) is an increasing and concave function, results would not

qualitatively change, though. The simpler formulation we adopted has also the additional advantage that the utility
of customers who have bought in the past is not aﬀected by the outcome of the game, thus simplifying any welfare
analysis one might want to do.
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Proposition 5 (Network market, sequential - and intertemporal discriminatory - oﬀers) Equilibria are as follows:
• (Entry) If  ≤ 3  then both buyers buy from  the first paying a price 1 = 2 −    
the second paying a price 2 =  

• (Exclusion) If   3  then both buyers buy from  the first paying a price 1 = −  the
second paying a price 2 = .

Proof. In the second period, competition for 2 results in diﬀerent outcomes depending on the
choice of the first buyer. (i) If 1 bought from  the second buyer does the same if (and only
if) 2 = (2) − 2 ≥ ( + 1) − 2 = 2  Given that  ≥ 2 and (2) = ( + 1) = , the
firm setting the lowest price gets 2 . Standard Bertrand competition with cost-asymmetric firms

takes place and firm  supplies the second buyer at a price 2 =   (ii) If 1 bought from the
incumbent, the second buyer buys from firm  if (and only if) (1) − 2 ≥ ( + 2) − 2  Given

that (1) = 0 the second buyer buys from firm  iﬀ 2 ≤ 2 −  Lack of customer base implies
that, in order to capture 2  firm  cannot simply slightly undercut the incumbent, but it has to

grant a suﬃciently large discount. In equilibrium, the incumbent supplies 2 at a price 2 = 
In the first period, 1 anticipates that the supplier she chooses will serve also the second buyer.
Then, the critical size necessary to enjoy utility from the network product will be achieved whatever
her choice and 1 is willing to buy from the supplier oﬀering the lowest price. In turn, suppliers
anticipate that failing to serve the first buyer implies failing to serve also the second, thereby losing
the profits that can be extracted in the second period. Also, the incumbency advantage creates an
asymmetry between such profits, with the incumbent earning  −  while the entrant earning  

Together with the diﬀerence in production costs, this generates asymmetric Bertrand competition
for the first buyer, with the minimum prices at which the incumbent and firm  are willing to

supply 1 being equal, respectively, to
e1

e1

=  − ( −  ) = 2 −   
= 0 −  

The comparison between e1 and e1 determines who gets the first buyer and the equilibrium price. If

e1  e1 , it will be the incumbent that serves the first buyer at a price which equals e1 . Otherwise,

the entrant will serve the buyer, who will pay E the price which equals e1 .

Note that in this simple network externality model the incumbency advantage enjoyed by firm

 - which is the source of exclusion - is now due to the incumbent already having a customer base
when the game starts, whereas the entrant still needs to reach a minimum critical mass in order for
consumers to derive any utility from sponsoring it. Also the entrant needs both buyers to achieve
such a critical mass. This creates an asymmetry in the profits that the two firms earn in the second
period, which translates into asymmetric competition for the first buyer. When the incumbent’s
marginal cost disadvantage is not too strong, the incumbent ends up capturing the first buyer,
thereby excluding the rival supplier.24
2 4 Also

in Carlton and Waldman (2002) - the variant based on network externalities - suppliers compete intensively
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Note also that in this simple model the price that the entrant is willing to oﬀer to the first buyer
is negative, implying that below-cost pricing is not suﬃcient to exclude: the incumbent needs to
subsidise the first buyer.25

3.4

Predation in two-sided markets

In this Section we propose a simple model of predation in a two-sided market, meant to capture
the essence of the Napp and Aberdeen Journal cases referred to in the introduction. The two
platforms  and  sell to two sides. We normalise to 1 the size of new consumers on each side. Side-1
consumers have a utility function which does not depend on the number of side-2 consumers, similar
to a hospital whose utility is unaﬀected by how many general practitioners buy the pharmaceutical
product (or to readers who do not care about advertising in their newspaper): 1 =  − 1 if they

buy one unit of the good from platform  =  . Side-2 consumers’ utility, instead, increases with
the number of consumers on the other side of the market, similarly to the ’community market’
whose demand raises with the hospital demand in the Napp case (or to advertisers whose demand

increases with the number of readers of a newspaper). Side-2 utility function is accordingly given
by 2 = 2 (1 ) − 2 if they buy one unit from platform  =   where 1 ∈  + is the total

number of side-1 consumers who buy from platform  at present or that bought in the past. We
assume that 2 (1 ) is weakly increasing in 1 and that a critical mass of at least one side-1

consumer is required to achieve a positive utility from consumption: 2 (0) = 0 and 2 (1 )  0 for
1 ≥ 1; in particular, to be consistent with the previous section, we maintain the simplification

that 2 (1 ) = (1 + 1) =  for any 1 ≥ 1. Also, we assume that the incumbent firm  has

already a side-1 customer base 1 = 1, while the new firm  has no customer yet when the game

starts. (The old buyers are not buying any longer, but continue to use the product.) Firm  is
more cost-eﬃcient than firm  - marginal costs are respectively given by 0 =      - and it
does not need to pay any fixed cost to enter the market. Finally, apart from possible diﬀerences
in their sizes, the two platforms are homogeneous and incompatible.26 The game is as follows.
1. First period.
(a) Firms   simultaneously set prices 1 and 1 to side-1 buyer.
(b) Side-1 buyer decides from whom to buy.
2. Second period.
(a) Firms   simultaneously set prices 2 and 2 to side-2 buyer.
(b) Side-2 buyer decides from whom to buy.
3. Utilities are realised.
for the first cohort of consumers, and such a competition may result in exclusion of the more eﬃcient entrant. In
their case, though, the asymmetry between the incumbent and the entrant is created by the former being already
active in the market for a complementary product to the network product, rather than by already having a customer
base when the game starts.
2 5 If prices were restricted to be non-negative predation may still arise but there may be multiple equilibria for
any given parameter space.
2 6 Motta and Vasconcelos (2009) study exclusion in two-sided markets in a more general context where two-sided
externalities arise and where purchasing decisions are simultaneous rather than sequential.
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The analysis is quite similar to the case of network eﬀects, and results can be summarised in
the following way.
Proposition 6 (Two-sided markets) Equilibria are as follows:
• (Entry) If   3  then both buyers buy from  the side-1 paying the price 1 = 2 −  
and the side-2 paying the price 2 =  .

• (Exclusion) If  ≥ 3  then both buyers buy from  the side-1 paying the price 1 = −
and the side-2 buyer paying the price 2 = .

Proof. Let us start from the second period. If the side-1 consumer bought from  then the side-2
consumer is willing to buy from  if (and only if) 2 = 2 (1) − 2 ≥ 2 (1 ) − 2 = 2  Since

1 = 1 the side-2 consumer buys from the supplier oﬀering the lowest price, as long as such price

is below 2 (1) =    (by assumption) The equilibrium prices are then 2 = 2 =  with firm
 supplying the side-2 buyer. If instead the side-1 consumer buys from the incumbent, then the
side-2 consumer is willing to buy from  if (and only if) 2 = 2 (0)−2 ≥ 2 (1 +1)−2 = 2 

From 2 (0) = 0   = 2 (2) = 2 (1 + 1) it follows that firm  has to oﬀer a suﬃciently large
discount in order to capture the side-2 buyer: 2 ≤ 2 −  In equilibrium 2 =    and 2 = 0
with the the incumbent supplying the the side-2 consumer.

In the first period, the side-1 consumer is willing to buy from the supplier bidding the lowest
price (her utility being unaﬀected by the number of buyers addressing a given platform). Suppliers
anticipate that who gets the side-1 buyer will also get the side-2 buyer. As shown above, the
incumbency advantage together with the production cost asymmetry make the incumbent and
firm  extract diﬀerent profits from the side-2 consumer, with  earning  −  while firm 

earning   Then, the minimum prices at which they are willing to supply the side-1 consumer are

respectively:
e1

e1

= 2 −   
= −

When 3 ≤  the former is lower and the incumbent captures the side-1 buyer by subsidising

her purchase.

4

Conclusions

We have presented a simple theory of predation which is based on the presence of scale economies.
The prey would need to reach a certain scale of operations (or a certain amount of profits) in order
to be profitable. Knowing this, the incumbent-predator would have an incentive to incur losses
on early buyers (or markets), so as to deprive the entrant of the scale (or profits) it needs, thus
eliminating competition on later buyers (or markets), where the incumbent could then make high
profits. Consistent with the standard description of predatory pricing, our model predicts that in
an exclusionary (predatory) equilibrium, a profit sacrifice phase followed by a recoupment phase.
This equilibrium exists only if scale economies are suﬃciently important and the incumbent is not
too ineﬃcient relative to the entrant.
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We have showed that this simple mechanism applies to a number of settings: economies of scale
may exist on the supply-side or on the demand side (due to network eﬀects); markets might be
related by the existence of common costs or being two-sided; predation might aim at excluding the
prey from the market altogether, or at relegating it to a niche market.
Testing the robustness of the model by modifying a number of assumptions, we have also
obtained insights as to conditions and markets where it is more likely that predation based on this
mechanism may arise. For instance, in the case where scale economies are on the production side,
we would expect predation to exist in situation where actual entry takes time (the entrant would
find it more diﬃcult to pre-commit to entry), where breach of contracts is more diﬃcult (due to
high transaction costs, legal costs, and buyers’ fragmentation), where downstream competition is
less fierce. If scale economies are on the demand side, predation is more likely to occur when there
are important switching costs for past buyers, or where purchase is infrequent (these conditions
increase the value of the installed base of the incumbent) and where of network externalities are
important.
We have argued that in several of the recent predation cases pursued by EU antitrust agencies,
the economic rationale for predation lies on the exclusionary mechanism we have described. Our
paper provides competition agencies with a new theory of harm in predation cases, and help them
understand whether the actual evidence fits with the conditions under which predation might take
place. Obviously, we do not claim that our predation theory replaces or generalises the traditional
theories of predation. In some cases, predation might be more likely motivated by the desire of an
incumbent to build a reputation for aggressive behaviour, to discourage further entry, or by the
attempt of a well-funded dominant firm to make it more diﬃcult for a new firm to obtain external
funds. But in other cases, our scale-economies mechanism might fit the evidence better. Further,
these diﬀerent rationales are not necessarily inconsistent with each other and might co-exist: our
theory does not exclude that an incumbent might want to deprive a particular entrant of the scale
it needs while at the same time sending a message to other potential entrants that it is ready to
do the same in the future; and being aggressive to an entrant to deprive it of the profits it needs
might have the eﬀect of reducing the entrants’ assets, and therefore making it more diﬃcult for it
to obtain funds in an imperfect capital market.
For instance in what is probably the most important EC predation case, Akzo Chemie was found
guilty of predation in the market for organic peroxides, a chemical product used as a flour additive
in the UK and more generally in the chemical industry.27 According to the European Commission,
Akzo started to prey upon its smaller rival ECS when the latter firm - previously limiting itself to
sell organic peroxides as a flour additive in the UK - started to target a bigger market and made
oﬀers to BASF, one of the biggest clients of Akzo. To substantiate the allegations, the Commission
Decision reports - among other things, including some documental evidence of a predation plan instances of Akzo’s making below-cost oﬀers to ECS most important business clients, with serious
eﬀects on ECS:
"The value of ECS’ flour additives sales in the United Kingdom had by 1984 declined
to 70 % of its 1980 sales (...). In eﬀect the "independents" and Allied Mills lost to
2 7 Commission

Decision IV/30.698 (ECS/Akzo ) of 14 December 1985. Published in OJ L 374, 31 December 1985.
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AKZO UK accounted for almost one-third of its flour additive business in the United
Kingdom.
The general decline in prices of flour additives also involved a reduction in the margins
on the business which ECS retained. In order to remain in business (says ECS) it was
obliged to increase its bank borrowings substantially thereby incurring additional bank
charges and interest.
The lack of available funds also caused ECS to reduce its budget for research and
development and to delay modifications to its plant intended to deal with new organic
peroxide business." (para. 50)
This seems to be consistent with both the mechanism characterised in this paper (target some
key customers so as to deprive the prey of the profits it needs to pay fixed costs necessary to
operate, expand operations, or enter other markets) and with the financial market predation motive
as presented by Bolton and Scharfstein (by reducing ECS’ profits, it became more costly for it to
acquire funds in the financial markets).28
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